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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WARD C. HOLBROOK and 




WEBSTER'S, INC., a corporation, 
Defendant and 
.Appellatnt, 
ELVIN COON, et ux and et al, 
Defendants, 
and 
LEONARD A. TRIMBLE and 







This appeal is taken by Webster's, Inc., from an 
Order granting a Summary Judgment against this 
Defendant. 
The parties in this brief will be referred to as they 
appeared in the Court below with Ward C. Holbrook and 
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Mabel F. Holbrook being the Plaintiffs, and Webster's, 
Inc., being one of the Defendants, and Leonard A. Trim-
ble and Alice Trimble being another Defendant but also 
a Respondent. It should be noted throughout that Web-
ster's, Inc., was the successor to Webster Coal and Lum-
ber Co. It should further be noted that the Plaintiffs are 
the Assignees of the Real Estate Mortgage originally 
taken by Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion ( R 11), and that the Trimbles are the successors 
in interest of the builder, Elvin Coon. 
On September 7, 1956, the Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit 
against the Defendant, Webster's, Inc., and others seek-
ing to foreclose a Mortgage on some real property in 
Davis County, State of Utah, and set out in the Com-
plaint that this Defendant, among others, claimed a lien 
right for materials and labor furnished to the property. 
Mr. Elvin Coon was a general contractor and builder of 
homes in Salt Lake and Davis Counties and had built the 
home in question, together with another home on an ad-
jacent lot, but because of financial problems had been 
unable to pay all of the creditors, including the material-
men, for work performed upon the property. The De-
fendant, Webster's, Inc., filed a materialman's lien 
against the property of Mr. Coon, which lien was recorded 
on April11, 1956, in Book 103, at Page 57 4. This lien was 
for $2,443.14. The lien "Tas referred to in Plaintiffs' Com-
plaint and recognized by the Plaintiffs as haYing been 
recorded. In filing this lien, Elvin Coon was referred to 
by Webster's, Inc. in the Notice of Lien as "The con-
tractor and owner and the reputed owner of said prem-
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ises ... " (Exh. D1) The Defendant, Webster's, Inc. 
answered Plaintiff's Complaint and set up its claims to 
the materialman's lien and asked for the foreclosure of 
said lien. Pursuant to a notice filed by Plaintiffs and 
on March 2, 1957, the Defendants appeared and proved 
up their liens as shown by Exhibits A to D inclusive and 
1 to 8 inclusive. On March 29, 1957, only the Plaintiffs, 
Mr. and Mrs. Holbrook, filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment pursuant to U. R. C. P. 56. Argument was had 
on this Motion for Summary Judgment and a Memo-
randum submitted by both parties (R 32). Thereafter, 
the Court on June 18, 1957, signed an Order granting 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and on June 
28, 1957, signed an Order granting Summary Judgment 
to the Defendant Leonard A. Trimble and Alice Trimble 
against this Defendant and others. This Defendant now 
appeals from the Orders granting the Summary 
Judgments. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN GRANTING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN GRANTING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
There appears to be only two possible points which 
could be raised to permit the Court to to grant the Sum-
mary Judgment. The first of these points would be 
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whether or not the record unequivocally shows that the 
Defendant Webster's, Inc. failed to properly file and 
record a lien as required by the statutes of the State of 
Utah, and the second point would be whether or not the 
Defendant Webster's, Inc. has ever released its lien and 
claim to any lien. The applicable statutory provisions of 
the Utah Code relating to the filing of mechanic's liens are 
found in Title 38, Chapter 1, U. C. A., 1953, and the pro-
visions which affect this action in particular are as 
follows: 
'' 38-1-2. Whoever shall do work or furnish mate-
rials by contract, express or implied, with the 
owner, as in this chapter provided, shall be deemed 
an original contractor, and all other persons doing 
work or furnishing materials shall be deemed 
subcontractors.'' 
"38-1-7. Every original contractor within eighty 
days after the completion of his contract, and ex-
cept as hereinafter provided, eYer~~ person other 
than the original contractor claiming the benefit of 
this chapter within sixty days after furnishing the 
last material or performing the last labor for or on 
any land, building, improvement or structure, or 
for any alteration, addition to or repair thereof, or 
performance of any labor in, or furnishing any 
materials for, any mining or mining claim must file 
for record with the county recorder of the county 
in which the property or some part thereof, is sit-
uated a claim in writing-, containing a notice of 
intention to hold and claim a lien, and a statement 
of his demand after deducting all just credits and 
offsets, with the name of the owner, if known, and 
also the name of tlw person by whom he was em-
ployed or to whom he furnished the material, with 
a statement of the terms, time giYen and condi-
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tions of his contract, specifying the time when the 
first and last labor was performed, or the first and 
last material was furnished, and also a description 
of the property to be charged with the lien, suffi-
cient for identification, which claim must be veri-
fied by the oath of himself or some other person. 
''When a subcontractor or any person furnished 
labor or material as stated above at the instance 
and request of an original contractor, then such 
subcontractor's or person's lien rights, as set 
forth herein, are extended so as to make the final 
date for the filing of a notice of intention to hold 
and claim a lien sixty days after completion of the 
original contract o fthe original contractor.'' 
In this particular case, the record shows that the 
Defendant, Webster's, Inc. delivered the last materials 
to the job on January 18, 1956 (Defendant's Exhibit No. 
2), and the record further shows that this Defendant 
recorded its lien against the property on April 11, 1956 
(R-4 and Defendant's Exhibit No. 1). Thus the Defend-
ant Webster's, Inc. lien was filed eighty-three days after 
the last materials were furnished by this Defendant. The 
question then becomes whether or not the record unequiv-
ocally shows that Elvin Coon was the owner of the real 
estate so that this Defendant would have to be a general 
contractor and, therefore, filed its lien within eighty days 
or whether it had sixty days after the general construc-
tion was completed. There is no doubt but what the lien 
has been recorded within sixty days after the last labor 
and materials were performed upon the property. The 
notice of lien filed by Webster's, Inc. defines Mr. Elvin 
Coon as being '-'the contractor and owner and reputed 
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owner of said premises." (Defendant's Exhibit No. 1) 
This makes the record questionable as to whether Mr. 
Coon was the ''owner'' or ''contractor'' and as such the 
record is not unequivocal that Mr. Coon was the owner. 
The Affidavit filed in this matter by Mr. William C. 
Quigley (R-39) shows that Prudential Federal Savings 
and Loan Association dealt with Mr. Coon as the con-
tractor in building said home and that Mr. Coon was held 
out as being the contractor of said home. This Affidavit 
is made by Mr. Quigley, who was the loan officer for 
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association and 
who handled and dealt with Mr. Coon in the matter of the 
building of this home. Since Prudential Federal Savings 
and Loan Association dealt with ~ir. Coon as the general 
contractor the Plaintiffs are in exactly the same position 
since they are suing to foreclose a mortgage as assignees 
of Prudential Federal (R 11). U. R. C. P. 13(j) provides 
as follows: 
"Except as otherwise pro·dded by law as to nego-
tiable jnstruments and assignments of aeeounts 
rer(·ivabie, any claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim 
which could have been asserted against an as-
signor at the time of or before notice of such 
assignment, may be asserted against his assignee, 
to the extent that such claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim does not exceed recovery upon the 
elaim of the assignee.'' 
This rule also applies in the assignments of a mortgage 
by a mortgagee as follows : 
''The general rule is that an assignee of a mort~ 
gage is Yl'sted \\'ith the powers and rights of the 
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mortgagee as fully as if he had been made such in 
the mortgage, but succeeds to no greater rights 
than those possessed by the assignor. Under this 
general rule, the assignee of a mortgage securing 
a non-negotiable obligation, even though he is a 
bona fide purehaser for value, takes subject to all 
existing equities which would have been effective 
as against the mortgagee. This is true as to equi-
ties between the original parties, and all defenses 
existent at the time of the assignment which might 
have been interposed by the mortgagor against the 
mortgagee or the assignor." (37 Am. Jur. p. 448) 
The Affidavit of Mr. Lyle D. Webster, who is the 
President of Webster's, Inc. and was the sole proprietor 
of the predecessor of Webster's, Inc., Webster Coal and 
Lumber Company, states that he was acquainted with Mr. 
Coon and that Mr. Coon was engaged in the general con-
tracting business and building of homes and that during 
the construction of this home he represented to the affiant 
that he was the general contractor in the building of this 
particular home. (R37) We respectfully submit that 
there is therefore a general issue of fact as to whether or 
not the Defendant Webster's, Inc. dealt with Mr. Coon 
as the contractor or the owner of the real property. Ad-
mittedly, anyone who deals with the owner of the real 
property is a contractor under our statutes; however, 
we take the position that in this case we have a different 
situation than covered by the statute because the Defend-
ant Elvin Coon held himself out as being the general 
contractor and therefore is estopped to deny that he was 
the general contractor of the property. The Defendants, 
Mr. and Mrs. Trimble, are his successors in interest and 
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take subject to his right and subject to any defenses 
available against him. These liens were of record before 
the Trimbles secured their quitclaim deed to the property. 
In fact, the quitclaim deed given by Mr. Coon to Mr. and 
Mrs. Trimble recited: 
"Grantees are aware that there are lien claims 
against the property, in excess of its value, and 
that the grantors herein are about to file a petition 
in bankruptcy." 
Since Mr. and Mrs. Trimble obtained their interest 
by means of a quitclaim deed they take the property sub-
ject to all the equities and defenses that could be asserted 
against the grantor. This is true not only because the 
deed recites the interests of the lien claimants but is also 
shown by the general rule set forth in the annotation in 
44 A.L.R. 1266 at page 1269, as follows: 
''It may be stated, therefore, that as a general rule 
the holder of such a deed (quitclaim deed) takes 
the land conveyed subject to all 'outstanding inter-
ests and equities shown by the records and such 
as are discoverable by the exercise of reasonable 
diligence. ' ' 
The law is well established as to the quantity of 
proof necessary to procure a Summary Judgment. 
Rule 56, U.R.C.P. (c) proYides in part: 
''The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, shou· that 
thrre is no grnuine issue as to any material fact, 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law .... '' (Emphasis added) 
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Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 6, in discussing Rule 
56, says: 
''The function of the summary judgment is to 
avoid a useless trial; and a trial is not only use-
less (sic) but absolutely necessary where there is 
a genuine issue as to any material fact. In ruling 
on a motion for summary judgment, the court's 
function is to determine whether such a genruine 
issue exists, not to resolve amy existing factual 
issues. This function is analogous to the practice 
of Rule 50, genuine issues of material fact are not 
to be resolved by the judge because both sides 
have moved for summary judgment.'' (Page 2101) 
(Emphasis added) 
"The courts are in entire agreement that the mov-
ing party for summary judgment has the burden 
of showing the absence of any genuine issues as to 
all the material facts, which, under applicable 
principals of substantive law, entitled him to judg-
ment. as a matter of law. The courts hold the 
movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his bur-
den, the movant must make a showing that is quite 
clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real 
doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of 
material fact ... And the papers supporting mov-
ant's are closely scrutinized, while the opposing 
papers are indulgently treated, in determining 
whether the movant has satisfied his burden.'' 
(Page 2123) 
We respectfully submit that there is a genuine issue 
of fact as to whether or not Elvin Coon held himself out 
as being a general contractor on the property and as a 
general contractor giving the individuals who supplied 
materials to him the rights of a sub-contractor with the 
right to file a lien within sixty days after the final work 
was completed upon the property. Certainly Elvin Coon 
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was estopped to claim any other position than that of a 
general contractor as shown by the Affidavits on file 
herein. Certainly in this case the Defendant Elvin Coon 
held himself out as being a general contractor on the 
property and this was relied upon by the Appellants 
herein to their damage, which is certainly the matter of 
an estoppel. 
Elvin Coon built a home on the adjacent property at 
about the same time this home was built and Mr. Coon 
sold this. Obviously Mr. Coon was in the building busi-
ness. He built and sold homes. This was his general occu-
pation. He was a licensed general contractor in the State 
of Utah (R 38). 
The Motion for Summary Judgment should not have 
been granted as being based upon the Receipt and Lien 
Release shown as Plaintiff's Exhibit A. This Receipt and 
Lien Release is an acknowledgment by Webster Coal and 
Lumber Company of a partial payment for labor and/or 
materials furnished upon the property in litigation. On 
the face of this instrument it is shown as a ''Contractors 
Authorization for Payment" and authorizes Prudential 
Federal Savings and Loan Association to pay to \Y ebster 
Coal and Lumber Company a sum of money for and on 
account of labor and materials deliYered and to be 
charged to a particular loan. It is significant to note that 
Elvin Coon signed both of these forms as the ''Con-
tractor," as is shown on the form. (See Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit A) The reverse side of this form states: 
''This receipt is executed and delivered by the un-
dersigned to the Association to induce it to make 
10 
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payment to the undersigned of the above stated 
sum fom the funds held by it for the owner of the 
above described real property and in consideration 
thereof the undersigned hereby waives, releases 
and discharges any lien or right to lien the under-
signed has or may hereafter acquire against said 
real property.'' (Plaintiff's Exhibit A) 
This Lien Release was given only for a partial payment 
~pe~& to cover the amount of money shown on the Lien Release. 
Ur. roo~ ( R. 37) In saying that they release and discharge any 
~~00. Lien which they have or may hereafter acquire against 
~raJ~ the property, the same was referring to the sum of 
ft~~~~~i money as shown on the Lien Release and not as to any 
future deliveries for merchandise and materials deliv-
ered after the date of the Lien Release nor to release any 
:notmli amount in excess of the sum shown. The Affiadvit of Mr. 
anuU~ Webster clearly states that the Release was given as a 
~ipt~ partial Release and for the amount of the payment only. 
Coall (R 37) We do not dispute the fact that it is possible for 
~ranMm a person to enter into a contract whereby he waives future 
1tion.ili Lien rights. We do, however, dispute the fact that the 
IDlra~M· record in this case clearly shows that such was the intent 
1rnaen~ of the parties when they executed the Receipt and Lien 
1We~a Release hereinabove referred to. The evidence must be 
Jrana® clear and unequivocal in order to support a Summary 
nato~ Judgment. ( Yowng vs. Felornia (1952) 121 Utah 646, 
no!e!ll! ( Cert. denied 344 US 885; 976 ed. 685) 244 P. 2d 862; 
le"r~f Ulibarri vs. Christenson 2 Utah 2d 367, 275 P. 2d J70) 
t!#li~ w We submit that in this case the evidence is not clear and 
unequivocal. The Affidavit of Mr. Webster, which must be 
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Affidavit clearly shows that the Receipt and Lien Release 
was not given as a Release of all Liens against the prop-
erty but rather a Release only to the extent of the pay-
ment. Defendant's Exhibit No. 2 clearly shows that con-
siderable materials were purchased after the date of the 
final "Receipt and Lien Release." The ledger card 
attached to Defendant's Exhibit No. 2 shows that these 
payments were only partial payments on a considerably 
larger balance. 
SUMMARY 
The Appellant respectfully requests the Court tore-
verse the District Court and permit the evidence to be 
presented to show the true position of the parties, and re-
spectfully submits that there is no evidence here to sup-
port a Summary Judgment in that there is a conflict as 
to whether or not Mr. Coon was the contractor or owner 
of the property in question; and further that the Receipt 
and Lien Release was given in satisfaction of partial pay-
ment only and was neither intended nor given to waive 
all future lien rights to the property. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEAN E. CONDER 
NIELSEN AND CONDER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
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